For the last two decades contemporary Europe’s military sphere has been created based on 1990’s euphoria when it was believed that a high-intensity conflict is impossible no longer possible within Europe. It was believed that traditional war would be succeeded by low-intensity asymmetric conflict somewhere outside Europe, with the military serving as a tool for international relations where any military’s political activity is not necessary. However, as the 2014. war in Ukraine showed, nowadays military threats can emerge in a way and that civil government is incapable of reacting in time. It means that there should be new civil-military principles on the role of the military during a state of insecurity.
Mg. hist. Roberts Rasums
The famous question, Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?, is almost as old as the state itself. A successful legislation and defence-capable military are the two most important sources of a state’s sovereignty, however there has always been a classical tension between independent civil government, which should have monopoly on violence, and the providers of this capability, namely, the military. In contemporary understanding of democracy, “suit control of uniform” has become fundamental principle of organization. Even if an undemocratic regime can provide effective control of the military, there cannot be a democracy where military has control over civil government. The military is represented by its decision-making level – officers’ corps; it is a highly bureaucratized structure where a higher position also means a higher political responsibility. In most cases, theory analyses relations between civilian government and highest military decision-making level.
Theoretically speaking, civil military relations have been viewed either as a static form of control over the military e.g. “objective military control”, or as an unsolvable conflict between the civil government and the military. This conflict is based on principal difference of both sides’ motives; the civil government bases its decision on more or less social and economic motives, at the same time keeping in mind the results of the next election, while the military is more or less independent from this form of control and aims its policy towards internal order and external security. The fundamental principle of civil military relations is based on the assumption that the military has a tendency to use its expertise and military power to gain more influence and eventually this could result in a coup d’etat. Even if this scenario is hypothetical, there is the actual problem of praetorianism.
The theoretical approach in this field has been discussed for sixty years. The first books on this field – the legendary “The Soldier and The State” by Samuel Huntington and “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Politic Portrait” by Moris Janowitz still form the basis of the theory. In the next decades there were several authors – Douglas Fever, Richard Kohn, Douglas Blandt, et cetera – who mostly have either criticized some aspects of the first two authors or tried to add to the first two “Grand theories” while keeping the theoretical basis intact. All these approaches were combined in some way by Douglas Bland in his “The Unified theory of Civil-Military Relations” where he pointed out four basic problems in civil-military relations[1]:
- The Praetorian problem. In Bland’s opinion this problem mostly is not relevant anymore because most of the states have already curbed power of the military establishment.
- Maintaining “good order and discipline”. It can be seen as a double-edged sword; on the one hand, a well armed and disciplined army can be a threat to democracy itself, while an undisciplined army is by definition threat to society’s order.
- The matter of military’s political alignment; the military should stay out of the political sphere, but the civilian government should not use the military for political intrigues.
- The struggle between expert and decision level; if the minister of defence should came from civilian sphere, in most cases this person does not have the necessary expertise in the military field.
Theoretical and practical aspects
One can quickly emphasise several faults in this normative frame. Firstly, when Huntington wrote his book, he basically tried to fill a theoretical vacuum, and the theory is still mostly US-centred. It must be noted that the situation in the 1950s was cardinally different: the world was divided in an apocalyptical struggle between two superpowers, and no one had any clue how military will react in the new nuclear age. At the time of the fourth generation warfare, a view like this is too hyperbolised – war is not a simple political act between two state-level forces.
Secondly, nowadays the theory analyses scenarios of implementing this control during peacetime, e.g., “the military must analyse the risks and civilians decide how to react.” This lack of practice has led to a new paradigm; as Huntigton noted, the civil-military relations is struggle between two imperatives; to maximize military effectiveness and concentration and attempts to bring forward liberal demilitarization.[2] The existing theoretical frame emphasises the second imperative. One of the reasons is the result of the Cold war: the collapse of the Soviet Union was a direct result the first imperative. While the US was more or less liberal and didn’t put every possible resource to the military, the Soviet Union ended its militarisation with economical and social collapse.[3]
Thirdly, in theory the officer corps is viewed as a hopefully apolitical bureaucratic structure, leaving aside the question about the de facto existing economic, foreign policy and social influence that is based on the military organization itself. At the same time, one of the most popular solutions – increase civilian influence in military decision-making process- indirectly leads to politization. In this sense, there are more accents on Huntington’s “Objective military control” than on Janowitz “pragmatic professionalism” and the rationalized control is praised more than the military’s intellectual integration.
After the collapse of the Soviet Bloc there was a question on which principles the new Eastern Europe’s democracies should base their military reforms. As NATO stated, for countries that could wish to join the alliance, one of the first criteria was civilian control over military.[4] David Betz noted six basic principles, on which the general consensus was created: a civilian minister of defence, clear and unambiguous lines of legitimate authority, integrated civilian-military ministries of defence, parliamentary role in the oversight of defence, a non-partisan armed force, and public capacity for informed debate on defence matters.[5]
The case of Ukraine in 2014
The 17th Paragraph of Constitution of Ukraine states that “The defence of Ukraine, the protection of its sovereignty, territorial indivisibility and inviolability, are entrusted to the Armed Forces of Ukraine” and it is forbidden to use the armed forces to restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens.[6] Before the War in Ukraine the political and institutional framework of Ukraine’s military was considered to be “the fundamental achievement.”[7] The structure consisted of the President of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council, the Minister of Defence, and the Chief of the General Staff. The ultimate authority rested with the president under the terms of the 1991. There was a presidential decree that the president cannot be a serving military officer.[8] However, the civil-military system of Ukraine could not fully be considered as fully westernized because there was unsolved tension between Parliament about the grand defence strategy and because of practise to appoint Ministers of Defence from the military. Because of these problems even after twenty years it was not possible to provide a clearly defined defence policy document so there was also no proper operational level military development.[9]
When in 2014 the first “little green men” units appeared in the Crimean peninsula, there was clear political and economic activity from Verkhovna Rada – Ukraine succeeded to convince Western powers to start first sanctions and then started economic sanctions against peninsula in its own turn. However, there was practically no military reaction. Despite the small numbers of Russian special troops in the region, Ukraine was not able to decide how to react against de facto Russian intervention. One of the problems was the absence of Victor Yanukovych because war can be declared only upon the submission by the President of Ukraine that must after be approved by the Verkhovna Rada.
During the first month of the crisis, one after another, Ukrainian units surrendered to a smaller number of lightly armoured opponents .[10] One of the most popular excuses was the lack of direct order.[11] It led to surreal situations in which communication between units and the general staff was made via Skype.[12] On the other side, it is understandable why Ukrainian officers could not be ready to take offensive action against a mixed force of Russian Special Forces and local civilians, but this argument can’t be used in speaking about ships in the harbour of Sevastopol where twelve to seventeen were standing ready for battle.[13] The commander of Ukraine Fleet in Crimea, admiral Denis Berezovsky changed sides while his successor, admiral Sergei Haiduk was kidnapped by a Russian Special Forces unit.
Even after the seizure of ships started, there was no reaction from the government. The reaction of minesweeper Cherkassy (U-311) was significant; the ship’s crew several times asked for any orders how to react to hostilities till it surrendered to Russian boarding team. Her crew tried, for two times, to break into the open sea and for several times, using water cannons repealed any attempts to seize the ship, however because of the lack of direct orders, her crew didn’t use any lethal weapons.[14]
The cases of the US and Israel
During the last decades there have been several cases when military could have and should have acted as guardians from military intentions of civilian government. One of the most famous cases is so-called “General Uprising” in the spring of 2006 when six retired US generals called on Donald Rumsfeld to resign from his post.[15] The reason was Rumsfeld’s attempts to control military decision making, as perceived by experts in the military, especially in the case in which the army chief of staff general Eric Shinseki told in the congressional meeting that the Iraq war won’t be a low-scale operation with small US force capable of bringing peace. The discussion triggered question of military’s duty in case when the civil government is considering to engage in military opportunism.[16]
There are such precedents even further in the past; it is connected with the war in Vietnam and President Johnson’s “Five silent man” – Joint Chiefs of Staff – who gave their military advice that it won’t be possible to win Vietnam without mobilization.[17] The advise was not taken, and as later said general Harold K. Johnson: “I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, “You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.”[18]
On the other hand, it is possible that the civil government can be unable to make the necessary decision. Israel is the only western-standard democracy that has been under constant military threat for years.[19] In 1967 when Egypt started to concentrate its forces in Sinai Peninsula, Israeli Defence Forces forced Prime Minister Eshkol to start a preventive war. It is famously symbolized with general Weizman’s gesture in prime minister’s office, demonstratively throwing on table his insignia as symbol of resignation if Israel won’t start the operation.[20]
Institutionalization of rights to violate the subordination
During the first stage of Crimean crisis, the Armed forces of Ukraine operated by Western civil-military standards, i.e. there was no independent action without orders because there were no orders. On the one hand, one can say that if democracy has made the decision that led to its destruction in democratic way, it is the right decision; however this radical approach cannot be taken as basic operation principle because it is hard to restore the democracy if there is no state within which it can be done. And, as the case of Ukraine showed, even a large and powerful state can become mired into crisis if the civil government is not able to react accordingly.
It must be noted that idea of institutionalizing the right to violate the principle of subordination should not be looked at only as a simple mechanism when a state has been drawn into a crisis of an existential level. Even if one can speak about the militarization of the western grand-power democracy it should be noted that at least in the past fifty years it was politicians, who made the final decision about going into war (for example, The Bay of Pigs operation, Vietnam war, Iraq war et cetera), not the military. In this point it is worth to remember Janowitz’s note that in the current military situation where world’s nuclear arsenal is capable to destroy the whole world, officers become more tended into a “dove’s” position because of their understanding of self-pride and moral worth.[21]
In classical military theory there is no deep analysis of situation where the military is opposed to civilian’s aggressive actions. Nowadays when cyber and asymmetric warfare become more and more important, every state, even the smallest one, can achieve some effective offensive capability. In this understanding, the military must not only be controlled – it should become a guardian from itself.
It is clear that in all aforementioned cases the military’s independent action was necessary, but there should be institutional framework for such actions: Firstly, independent action can only be a reaction to threat that otherwise would cause a state of insecurity. This action can’t become a reason of insecurity. In the case of possible decision to start a conflict (as it happened in 2003 or 1955), the military should act as “guardian of guardians”. In 1950, the Nuremberg Tribunal defined Crimes against Peace, in Principle VI as “(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i)”[22]. If it is a crime to be a part of war planning (that basically is purpose of General Staff), military should have the power to legally resist such orders.
In the defensive situation (as in Ukraine or in Israel) this can be seen more clearly because the threat is in the outside the decision-making level; if there are little green men, natural disasters or military intervention with no appropriate reaction, the military should be able to fulfil its duty. It is important to note that situation like this can be acceptable only when there is a state of insecurity, e.g. when there is an existential threat and there is no appropriate response to it. So, if there is a legal mechanism that could let the military to react without direct order, there must be a mechanism that states when this should end. Otherwise it can became a legal framework for a coup d’etat or an even worse scenario, if, for example some officers are not satisfied with peace terms. However, it cannot be done only with a legal framework – the officer corps must be ready to serve its purpose, but nowadays it means to be ready to make a political decision. To be able to do this, an officer must be political because only if an officer will be trained, first of all, as a citizen and only then as professional, during a crisis situation he will be able to see the blurred line of democracy.
[1] Bland, D, (1999) A unified theory of civil-military relations. Armed Forces & Society. 26(1). pp. 12-13
[2] Feaver P. The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control Armed Forces & Society 1996 pp. 165.
[3] Burk, J. (2002). Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations Armed Forces & Society 29(1). pp.8
[4] North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en
[5] Betz David J. (2004) Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe, RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series 2, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, pp.13-14
[6] Constitution of Ukraine. Retrieved from: http://.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/52
[7] Mychajlyszyn, N.(2002) Civil-Military Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Implications for Domestic and Regional Stability. Armed Forces & Society 28(3). No. 28 (3). pp. 459
[8] Mychajlyszyn, N.(2002) Civil-Military Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Implications for Domestic and Regional Stability. Armed Forces & Society 28(3). No. 28 (3). pp. 459
[9] Mychajlyszyn, N.(2002) Civil-Military Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Implications for Domestic and Regional Stability. Armed Forces & Society 28(3). No. 28 (3). pp. 465-466
[10] Weitz, R. (2014) 9 views on the militarization of the Ukraine crisis. Russia Direct. Retrieved from http://www.russia-direct.org/reviews/9-views-militarization-ukraine-crisis
[11] Herszenhorn, D., Kramer, (2014) A. Ukraine Plans to Withdraw Troops From Russia-Occupied Crimea. The New York Times. Rerieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/world/europe/crimea.html?_r=
[12] Украина. Киев. Власть предала военных Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wi590cEmnqo
[13] Standler C. (2014) Ukraine’s Last Ship. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2014/04/11/ukraines-last-ship
[14] Standler C. (2014) Ukraine’s Last Ship. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2014/04/11/ukraines-last-ship
[15] Mandeles, M. Presentation to the Military Classics Seminar, 19 May 2009, Fort Myers’s Officer’s Club
[16] Myers,R, Kohn R. (2007) The Military’s Place Foreign Affairs. 86(5) pp. 148
[17] H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (Harper Perennial, 1998)
[18] Cook, M. (2008) The Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics. Parameters, 38(1) pp. 9
[19] Michael J. (2007) The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil–Military Relations The “Discourse Space” Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process Armed Forces & Society 33(4).pp. 522
[20] Ben-Eliezer Uri (1997) Rethinking the Civil-Military Relations Paradigm: The Inverse Relation between Militarism and Praetorianism through the Example of Israel. Comparative Political Studies, 30(3). pp. 367
[21] Janowitz M. (1960) The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. pp.. 440
[22] Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945.