Panel Participants:
H.E. Urmas Reinsalu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia
Boris Ruge, Vice-Chairman of the Munich Security Conference
Prof. Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Russia
Moderator:
Elīna Lange Ionatamishvili, Senior Expert, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
The discussion was set with an acknowledgment of certain fundamental changes in global dynamics. The Chinese economy is soon going to overtake the US, becoming the largest economy in the world by 2024. US dominated unipolarity will thus be overturned in favor of a multipolar reality, in which US supremacy is maintained only in the military realm. As these changes take place, Russia seeks a dominant role in Eurasia and in its traditional sphere of influence.
The first discussant tackled the prompt by first highlighting that though Russia acts by consistently changing its modus operandi, the modus vivendi stays the same. These encompass three goals. First, to expand its sphere of influence in a holistic approach. Second, to undermine the cohesion and credibility of the European Union and NATO as an aim itself. Third, to dismantle the current world order as it is perceived. The Russian toolkit is diverse, ranging from proxy wars in Syria and Libya, and different types of disinformation campaigns like Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, moldova, etc. The Russian leadership is now also attempting to change the future by rewriting the past, distorting the truth behind past crimes and aggressions of the Soviet Union. Hybrid warfare is becoming more common, and accelerating Russia’s position as global superpower. Concurrently, Russia pays no heed to international law where it does not have to. Deterioration of human rights there remains a serious concern – the use of chemical weapons against those who Russia perceives as adversaries is fully acceptable. This has come with price of sanctions, but Russia’s aggressive behavior has continued. Western values do not overlap with those as Russia as much as we want to – to this end, more caution needs to be expended with Russia, and should offer more stability to allies in region. Western allies must speak with one voice towards Russia, which is currently not the case.
Attempting to offer a Russian perspective, the next discussant presented four points of priorities and logic behind Russian foreign policy. First, Russia positions itself as an independent great power in a multipolar system, and sees the rise of China as both a threat and an opportunity. So far, the opportunities have overwhelmed the challenged. Russia aims to keep its neighborhood centered on itself, but aims to maintain the use outside of post-soviet space to rather take part in shaping other regions. This is what it has been doing and continues to do, with the example of rejecting other regional powers like Turkey as equals. From this perspective, Russia is trying to maintain its sphere of influence, not necessarily expand – the Baltic States are not a goal of potential Russian aggression. Second, the current global development is considered to be largely beneficial to Russia, as the current global development is considered to be favorable to Russian foreign policy. Russia is recognized as a legitimate great power by most non-wester powers, and many are interested in cooperating with it to strengthen their own independence. Third, confrontation with the West should and will continue to take place, as they are considered affordable operations. Ultimately, Russian terms will have to be accepted by the US, and European Union due to what Russia considered a destabilized and weakened internal order within the transatlantic alliance, and the growing irrelevance of it in the post-soviet space, as their focus turns to China. Fourth, Russian foreign policy combines strengthening partnerships with non-western partners and confronting the US and European Union. The agenda with the aforementioned will be narrow – how to manage confrontation, emphasizing strategic stability. However, regardless of Biden’s activities in the next few years, Russian strategy is unlikely to change.
Discussants raised the point of whether Russia is at risk of becoming a junior partner to China. The current trend does not seem to be heading that way, but discussants pointed out that it cannot be denied that the Russian economy is suffering, without any clear answers in sight. The Trump declaration of confrontation with China was overall great for Russia, as until that moment the US was mainly interested in Russia, hence, Russia sees itself as securing more freedom to maneuver. Regardless, the asymmetry between the Russian and Chinese economy is increasing, and it may become an issue down the road. For example, the Shanghai cooperation organization is frozen, and Russia is resisting activities of the framework – rejecting the idea of a free economic zone.
The discussion was brought back to the policy against Russia on the Western front. Discussants highlighted several core issues that remain to be answered. The US wants Nordstream 2 to stop, as do many other European allies – however, Germany remains on board with the project. How new US leadership can handle this project will be important to advancing the future US relationship with Europe, especially with Germany as a core continental ally of the US. Concurrently, there is a need for immediately expanding sanctions against Belarus, which Russia is trying to ensure does not get removed from Russian sphere of influence. However, it seems that the Belarusian people are turning against Russia as it is perceived to be propping up the Lukashenko regime.
The discussion concluded with discussants posing that Russia still acts as an empire acting over its legacy. 2014 was an icebreaker of attitude of west to the end of illusion of Russian warming – the Russian philosophy isn’t changed, but toolbox has broadened, with aggressive war on EU territory becoming a possible tool. The question is whether Russia is Russia retreating or re-entrenching, and calibrating ambition. Armenia has discovered that it is a client – not an ally. Russia has discovered that Turkey is a reality and a power, which must be deterred. On all axes Moscow is trying to treat others on a utilitarian calculus of Russian interests, not mutual interests. There is no new détente, and Western powers will have to act appropriately.