Author: Enia Kaņepēja, Riga Stradiņš Unversity
Is it possible that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have come together due to their shared geographical location, historical experience, and challenges? Each of the three Baltic states are relatively small. As a result of a range of common interests and difficulties, the Baltic states have become more influential with “louder voices” within the EU. The Baltic states must embrace multilateral cooperation as a crucial aspect of the formation of their shared interests in the European Union to highlight their interests. This paper will examine how the small Baltic States can better shape their European policy priorities, especially relating to the shared energy interests and influences from such autocratic states like Russia and China. This essay will focus on the conclusions and arguments by the heads of foreign affairs committees of the Baltic Parliaments, Marko Mikhelson, Rihards Kols, and Žygimantas Pavilionis, at the annual Rīga Conference 2021. Despite the fact that the Baltic states do not always share the same viewpoints, their partnership exemplifies positive, dynamic, democratic value-driven cooperation.
The first issue raised by Rihards Kols as one of top priorities for the Baltic states is the energy security. He emphasized the following that the Baltic states have not quite understood the significance of this concept. It has been and continues to be a challenge for the Baltic region.[1] Previously, the Baltic states dealt with energy issues on their own. Owing to the lack of political will and despite the existence of regional forums, any progress relating to shared policy initiatives and challenges has been slow. Positively, the Baltic states are united in their desire to synchronize their natural gas markets, enhance shared electricity networks, and boost the production of renewable energy, which is especially important given that Moscow still coordinates and controls their parts of their power transmission systems and supply of energy resources.[2] It is also necessary to emphasize the role of the autocratic Russia in Baltic energy politics, which has become a focus point for debates and concerns. The relationship between the European Union and Russia is centred on Energy. Moreover, Russia also has referred to it as an instrument for spreading its influence and of foreign policy.[3]
The EU view on energy is varied, indicating that comprehensive common mechanisms for energy market coordination are still a long way off. The challenge here is whether the Baltic states can develop a shared energy policy that is less dependent on Russia, utilizing policies of the European Union. In reality, the Baltic states have taken steps in the past to address their energy reliance. They have made headway in terms of electricity connectivity, and their transit capacity has improved. The result is the better overall energy security in terms of supply by launching or constructing the infrastructure for better natural gas and electricity market diversification.
Since 2008, most of the European Union financing have gone to the Baltic energy market interconnection plan (BEMIP) initiatives in order to meet the Baltic states’ critical requirements. Despite this, many of these initiatives have remain dormant or delayed.[4] Despite the European Union’s sometimes incoherent energy policy, the Baltic states can be pushed by the European Union with additional financial help and oversight. States can use it to identify common ground in their energy interests and strengthen political resolve to speak with one voice about energy governance. Governments in the Baltic states should develop a long-term national energy policy plan with a regional perspective rather than national ones.
Another item that was discussed was the situation with common Russian threats. That includes the related hybrid threats from Belarus, which actors are presently confront with. Moreover, opportunities such as the cooperation with the Nordic countries must be better utilized. These factors should be considered together since, given the current situation in Belarus, it is undeniable that the importance of the neighbourhood, which is most affected during times of crisis, cannot be overstated. Friends with influence can be of great assistance. The Baltics have powerful neighbours in their Nordic partners. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia all fight above their weight, but they lack the political clout to force decisive international interactions.
It is important to remember that problems can be addressed more effectively in a variety of formats, especially in light of ongoing discussions about cooperation with Nordic countries and, more broadly, cooperation in various formats. The European Union approach is not the only one, and it has the potential to “drag” the process out by allowing for greater escalation. For such regional collaboration, the Nordic-Baltic platform (NB8) is useful. Prospects are linked to increased transatlantic partnership between the US and the Baltic states, in addition to the Nordic-Baltic dimension. In light of US Vice President Joe Biden’s new foreign policy approach, the Baltic republics are seen as moral locomotives for larger powers.[5] This cooperation, as well as the enticement of powerful allies, provides an opportunity to create suitable policies in the face of significant countries such as China and Russia. To summarize, the “EU first” strategy will continue, but the weight of smaller players is based on their allies, hence multilateralism must be kept in mind.
Finally, yet maybe most crucially, Žygimantas Pavilionis stated that Baltic states must work together to address future challenges.[6] In terms of the future, China was singled out as a superpower that has swiftly expanded its influence. Marko Mikhelson pointed out that the “17+1” format does not work the way it was intended or hoped for ten years ago. Lithuania, for example, has pulled out of the format, Estonia supports the European Union format as a better method to enhance ties, and Latvia emphasizes that the European Union was and will continue to be at the forefront. Even though Latvia highlights the significance of the European Union’s role and supports other nations’ actions, it has not made a formal declaration of intent to leave the framework, as Estonia did.
Despite the fact that the European Union has not imposed any concrete restrictions on its cooperation with China, it feels that investment projects under the “17+1” arrangement should not undermine the bloc’s integrity. [7] Despite the rhetoric of countries and the European Union to develop a unified, separate-from-China policy, the involvement of activities and regional firms in partnership with this dictatorship indicates the opposite. Is China really a Trojan horse for the European Union? The accusations of a Trojan horse bolster the idea that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, unlike their Western counterparts, are untrustworthy and incapable of backing European Union interests in international affairs. Surprisingly, the CEE countries are criticized for doing exactly what Germany and France do when dealing with China: pursuing their national interests. It is vital to reduce mistrust, because the European Union’s internalized east-west divide might worsen, putting the European Union in a worse position than China.
In conclusion, The European Union functions as a road map, as states select their goal but must devise their own route to get there. The international arena is anarchic, and any organization is made up entirely of other countries. As a result, it is vital to recognize that decisions will not always be made in the best interests of all states. Finally, the Baltic republics appear to be on the same page as Europe, and, more significantly, they value democracy. Both the discussions in annual Rīga Conference 2021 and real-life practice demonstrate that states are eager to fight for democracy, the values of their country and common goals that promote universal prosperity for in a variety of formats.
[1] LATO Latvian Transatlantic Organisation. The Riga Conference 2021| 16 October. Taken from: https://youtu.be/rlVC9bgNB-8.
[2] Sprūds, A., Roskis, T. Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Energy pulling the Baltic Sea region together or apart? Taken from: https://liia.lv/site/attachments/17/01/2012/Energy-Baltic-region.pdf.
[3] Правительство Российской Федерации. 23.08.2003. Об утверждении Энергетической стратегии России на период до 2020 года. Распоряжение n 1234-р. Российская федерация. [sk. 26.11.2021.] Taken from: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901872984?section=text.
[4] Tabaka, E.01.02.2016. The EU Energy Union Project Delivery for the Baltic States: Energy Security Solution & Regional Cooperation Platform? Taken from: https://www.lai.lv/viedokli/the-eu-energy-union-project-delivery-for-the-baltic-states-energy-security-solution-regional-cooperation-platform-494.
[5] Djatkovica, E. The Belarus Crisis through the Eyes of its Baltic and Nordic Neighbors. Taken from: https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/03/the-belarus-crisis-through-the-eyes-of-its-baltic-and-nordic-neighbors/.
[6] LATO Latvian Transatlantic Organisation. The Riga Conference 2021| 16 October. Taken from: https://youtu.be/rlVC9bgNB-8.
[7] European Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy. Taken from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0382_EN.html.